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NETWORKING CUSTOMARY LAW 
Scott Sullivan∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In United States v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether 
gathering four weeks of GPS information capturing a suspect’s movement on 
public roads constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution.1   
In two separate concurring opinions, Justices Alito and Sotomayor 
rejected the notion that all of a citizen’s movements in public were free from 
the Amendment’s protection.2   A unifying theme for both justices was the 
power of contemporary technology to aggregate isolated acts into a 
comprehensive knowledge of a person’s private life.  Justice Alito writing on 
behalf of four Justices notes that, over time, the collection of “a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements reflects a wealth of 
detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”3  Separately, Justice Sotomayor writes that tracking technology 
provides “a substantial quantum of intimate information…that enables the 
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, [a person’s] political and 
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”4   
As in Jones, practices aggregating isolated acts into knowledge has 
typically focused on the impact on individuals.  This Article inverts that focus.  
Just as aggregating isolated pieces of public information provides tremendous 
knowledge of individuals, it also provide tremendous knowledge as to the acts 
                                                           
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, LSU Law Center; Associate, University of Texas 
Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law; J.D., University of Chicago, 2001; 
LL.M, European University Institute, 2002.  The author is tremendously grateful for the 
helpful comments provided during faculty colloquium engagements at George Mason 
University School of Law, the University of Oregon School of Law, the University of 
Arkansas School of Law, and Santa Clara University Law School. 
1 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see U.S. CONST., amend. IV.   
2 The concept that monitoring of “public” acts was not subject to the Fourth 
Amendment flows from United States v. Knotts.  460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
3 Jones, 132 S. Ct  at 955 (Alito, concurring), citing People v. Weaver, 12 N. Y. 3d 
433, 441-442, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2009); see also Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), No. 10-1259. 
4 Jones, 132 S. Ct at 925 (Sotomayor, concurring) 
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and beliefs of governments, the very elements that govern the formation of 
customary international law (CIL). 
As it stands, the established mechanisms of international law 
formation have stalled.  A primary cause of this legal sluggishness is the 
perceived illegitimacy of customary international law.  The design of CIL, 
emergent from the civil law tradition, was intended to enable a dynamic body 
of legal norms untethered to text.  Over time, both perceived and real 
infirmities within the system’s understanding of customary law have left 
customary law as a source of last resort.   
“Networked custom” offers an alternative understanding of CIL 
formation to reinvigorate the intended dynamism of CIL by tracking it to 
distillations of society’s diverse and dispersed.  While not embracing 
particular methodologies, the Article also explains the necessary 
characteristics and limiting principles in capturing networked intelligence.  
Ultimately, with a theoretical framework in place, this piece explains how 
applying networked custom can repair CIL’s legitimacy, restore its dynamism, 
and positively influence the unfolding expansion of international legal 
personality.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Customary international law (CIL), law said to form through 
widespread state practice that hardens into a sense of legal obligation (opinio 
juris) is the binding agent of the international legal system.  While treaties 
create the structural form of international law, CIL norms operate to tighten 
the inevitable breaches left within and between the express terms of written 
law.   
In many ways, CIL holds a privileged position in the international 
legal system.  Customary law is universal.  While treaties require explicit and 
affirmative approval, rules of customary law bind all states.  Customary law is 
cheap.  Customary law flows directly from that which states are engaged, thus 
resulting in minimal transaction costs.  Treaties, on the other hand, if 
successful at all, require endless negotiation, political maneuvers, redrafting, 
compromises and meetings.  Customary law is organically produced.  
Customary practices become law while no one is watching.  In contrast, the 
process of treaty ratification is fraught with political peril and thus subject to 
political assassination.  Most importantly, customary law is dynamic.  Once 
ratified, the subject matter governed by treaties is subjugated to the 
preeminence of text.  Even the most creatively worded treaty language draws 
boundaries in its operation and interpretation that constricts an adaptation to 
changed circumstances. 
Despite these advantages, CIL is under the heavy attack. Scholars have 
respectively characterized customary law for being inefficient, illegitimate, 
and ineffective.5  Recent literature argues that claims regarding the content of 
CIL is divorced from empirical claims of state practice and vary broadly 
dependent upon the entity asserting it.6  Failing to ground CIL content in 
externally provable claims renders such norms perpetually vague, which, in 
                                                           
5 See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 449 (2000); Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 859, 889-94 (2006); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International 
Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007). 
6 Curtis A. Bradley and Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal 
Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 6 (2010). 
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turn creates uncertainty, unpredictability, and diminished legitimacy.7  In 
answering the assault, “most defenders of CIL have responded by simply 
ignoring the critiques.”8 
This Article does not seek to assuage critics as to the current state of 
CIL, but rather persuade critics and advocates of customary law alike that a 
revitalized, more legitimate and effective body of CIL is available through 
identifying a comprehensive, authoritative and objective process of 
identifying state practice and opinio juris utilizing networked technology.  
Instead of scholarly or institutional edict, this proposal rests its case on recent 
developments in communication theory and the epistemic advantages offered 
through networked communications.  The result is a truer, more dynamic, and 
thus more effective body of customary law that proves capable of responding 
to the fundamental challenges facing the current legal regime. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I briefly set out the 
design impediments plaguing the efficient formation of international law and 
the consequences that flow from those flaws.  This part rejects the notion that 
treaty proliferation can replace the value established through a functional body 
of CIL. Part II turns its attention to creating legal legitimacy through adoption 
of knowledge attained through networked aggregation.  This Part first 
considers the legitimacy challenges facing CIL and then, in detail, describes 
and explains the value and animating features of collective intelligence and 
how it can be applied to customary law.  Regarding current conceptions, I 
argue that both critics and proponents of CIL have failed to recognize that it’s 
primary legitimacy failure is epistemic in nature.  In short, the failure of a 
robust knowledge of state practice and opinio juris, the inputs of CIL, such 
law has been victimized by diverse initiatives to manipulate its outcomes 
compromising its core legitimacy. Following this, I describe the animating 
principles of networked knowledge and their advantages in knowing and 
understanding the acts and beliefs of states.  Finally, in Part III, I briefly set 
out some of the fundamental impacts of networked knowledge beyond the 
direct question of CIL formation. 
                                                           
7 Id. 
8 Curtis A. Bradley and Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal 
Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2010). 
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I. INTERNATIONAL LAW FORMATION AND RESPONSIVE LAW 
On December 11, 2011, Christiana Figueres, the executive secretary 
for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, was 
absolutely ecstatic. The reason for Figueres’ excitement was the agreement of 
over 190 state parties to the “Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.” 
Invoking Nelson Mandela, Figueres wrote to her Twitter followers “It always 
seems impossible until it is done.  And it is done!”9  She was not alone in her 
excitement.  Jo Leinen, the Chair of the EU Parliament delegation to the 
conference declared, “The world has achieved a major breakthrough in the 
fight against climate change.”10 
Based upon the excitement expressed by Figueres and Leinen, you 
would be forgiven for believing that the Durban Platform represented the 
consummation of a global treaty with binding force.  In fact, the two-page 
agreement is much more modest, setting out a “road map” to guide states to 
the goal of actually consummating a treaty by 2015 which will take legal 
effect in 2020.  In the interim, the vast majority of state parties will have held 
election through which they may empower new heads of state, and, if the 
work of multiple scientists proves true, the world have long-missed the 
opportunity to head off the worse effects of climate change.11 
If the excitement of diplomats such as Figueres and Leinen is 
mystifying on the substance of the Durban Platform, it is much more 
understandable in the world of international diplomacy where the formation of 
new (and widely recognized) substantive international law, whether through 
treaty or custom, has become extraordinarily difficult.   
                                                           
9 See Climate Change Summit: Global Deal Recovered After Marahton Talks in 
Durban, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, December 12, 2011. 
10 See UN Climate Summit: Talks succeed, action must follow, EUROPEAN UNION 
NEWS, December 13, 2011. 
11 See John M. Broder, U.S. Pushes to Cut Emissions of Some Pollutants That Hasten 
Climate Change, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 16, 2012 (noting that by the time a treaty 
would be in force “scientists say that irreversible dmage to the atmosphere will be done.”).  In 
fact, two months following the announcement of the Durban Platform a group of countries 
announced unilateral measures due to their impatience with (and perhaps skepticism toward) 
“the slow pace of international climate change” negotiations. 
NETWORKING CUSTOMARY LAW - SULLIVAN 
 
DRAFT – DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 
 
7 
A. Explicit and Implicit Legal Rules 
CIL and treaty law are complementary and interdependent.  The 
increasing delegitimization of CIL and the tempting clarity of positivism have 
thrown the balance of the international legal system off kilter, threatening the 
viability of the robust system of norms that system has created.  The inability 
of CIL to deliver the pliability and general legal rules upon which the 
substantive rule of law can attach and adapt, threatens the effectiveness of 
treaty law as well.  Treaties, always highly costly to complete, are even more 
difficult to finalize because overarching general customary rules are not 
present providing points of general legal consensus.  When the cost of treaties 
is too high to complete, the absence of CIL leaves the substantive area fallow.  
When consummated, treaties are expected to exhibit flexibility in application 
far beyond the anchor of their text, threatening the predictive clarity that is 
their defining value.  As this progression intensifies, the substantive character 
of international law becomes increasingly locked in anachronism.  . 
1. The Limits of Treaty Formation and Alteration 
Treaties form the core of modern international law.12  Over the past 
several decades, there has been a natural progression of the international legal 
system, both in scholarship and practice, toward treaties and away from 
customary international law.  The movement toward  treaties is, in large part, 
a response to the assault on custom.13  Yet, the preference for treaties has not 
been accompanied by a corresponding increasing wave of treaty formation 
especially in relationship to the most pressing international issues of the day.14  
                                                           
12 Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict of the Final Frontier: The Law of War in 
Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 73 (2000).  
13 See David J. Bederman, National Security: Globalization, International Law and 
United States Foreign Policy, 50 EMORY L.J. 717, 733-734 (2001).  
14 While it is not uncommon to see references to the “proliferation of treaties”, such 
authors are typically referring to the set of multi-lateral treaties emanating directly following 
the conclusion of World War II.  See e.g., John Murphy, Book Review: The Evolving 
Dimensions of International Law: Hard Choices for the World Community, 104 AJIL 688, 
690 (2010).  This is not to say that there are not more treaties on highly particularlized 
questions.  See Ward Ferdinandusse, Out of the Black-Box? The International Obligation of 
State Organs, 29 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 45, 104 (2003).  The existence of these types of 
treaties, in fact, demonstrate where the strength of treaty law lies (precision) growing form 
existing law, while their necessity proves the weakening of custom. 
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The rise of treaties, partially driven by positivistic trends and the 
written nature of treaties, emphasized treaties’ provision of greater specificity 
regarding substantive regulations and areas of applicability.15  Treaties tend to 
possess clearer substantive rules and formal and identifiable mechanisms to 
gauge consent and breach.16  Broadly accepted multilateral treaties also assist 
in the movement toward legal uniformity among multiple nations in various 
circumstances.   
The rise of treaties, especially in the immediate period following 
World War II, has been instrumental to the dramatic substantive expansion of 
international law. 17  During the thirty years following the conclusion of that 
War the world saw the introduction of a several new treaties providing both an 
expansion of substantive legal scope, but also a new degree of precision by 
which states were bound by international law.  In contrast, the past thirty years 
has seen tremendous political, technological, and sociological changes without 
anything approaching the post-WWII treaty crescendo. The obstacles to new 
substantial treat law are essentially two-fold: prohibitively high costs 
associated with treaty formation and inertial commitment to treaties already 
made.   
                                                           
15 See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1999) (discussing the rise of 
positivism in international law); see also Harlan Douglas J. Sylvester, Customary 
International Law, Forcible Abductions, and America’s Return to the ‘Savage State’, 42 
BUFFALO L. REV. 555, 608 (1994); John K. Setear, Treaties, Custom, Iteration, and Public 
Choice, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 715, 736 (2005) (discussing advantages of explicit (written) law). 
16 “Treaty law features iterations with relatively distinct temporal boundaries; 
possesses clear, formal mechanisms for evaluating whether a nation has consented to certain 
rules; and boasts a prospective, written format, specifying rules that can serve as touchstones 
against which to assess the actual behavior of consenting nations.” Setear, supra note __, at 
722.   
17 Some literature explore the proposition that completed treaties reduce transaction 
costs of state entities for subsequent activities. See Aceves, supra note __, at 1016-18. This is 
undoubtedly true to varying extents based upon the area of law being regulated.  See id. at 
1060-64. The reduction in transaction costs for state activities relative to the area regulated is 
relevant to this analysis only insofar as such benefits represent the path dependence discussed 
earlier.  See id.  As such, the reduction of transaction costs in regulated areas (to the extent it 
exists) only acts to raise the costs of states seeking to alter substantive norms of the governing 
treaty.  See id.  
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Prohibitively high transaction, uncertainty, and opportunity costs make 
treaty law formation difficult.18  Unfortunately, the treaty creation process is 
extraordinary in the transaction costs required and uncertainty created. 19  At 
the front end, potential treaty parties vary greatly in their international power, 
history, underlying legal systems, languages, domestic politics, relevant 
interest groups, and economic framework, all of which may effect the 
negotiation, drafting, and agreement to a treaty.20  While the accumulation of 
treaty partners expands the reach of the proposed treaty’s scope, it 
simultaneously makes consensus on drafted language more difficult.  At the 
back end, once drafted, a state wishing to enter into the treaty has to undertake 
the incorporation and execution of the new treaty’s provisions within their 
own domestic system.21  In the United States, this means seeking a 
supermajority vote of U.S. Senators to accomplish ratification.22  Following 
                                                           
18 See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Role of National Courts: Treaty Law and Legal 
Transition Costs, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1303, 1308 (examining uncertainty costs of new 
treaties due to “questions of meaning, scope, and effect”); Elizabeth Burleson and Diana Pei 
Wu, Essay: Non-State Actor Access and Influence in International Legal and Policy 
Negotiations, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW REV. 193, 206 (“High transaction costs can hinder 
the formation of bilateral, regional, and global treaties.”); see generally Michael P. Van 
Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002). 
19 Some literature explore the proposition that completed treaties reduce transaction 
costs of state entities for subsequent activities. See Aceves, supra note __, at 1016-18. This is 
undoubtedly true to varying extents based upon the area of law being regulated.  See id. at 
1060-64. The reduction in transaction costs for state activities relative to the area regulated is 
relevant to this analysis only insofar as such benefits represent the path dependence discussed 
earlier.  See id.  As such, the reduction of transaction costs in regulated areas (to the extent it 
exists) only acts to raise the costs of states seeking to alter substantive norms of the governing 
treaty.  See id.  
20 “Transaction cost economics refines price theory by including consideration of, for 
example, the cost of identifying potential transactors, negotiating agreement and enforcing 
agreement. For a variety of reasons, including the number of interested parties, these 
transaction costs are frequently high in the international context, and opportunities for joint 
gain through contracting may therefore not be realized.”  Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. 
Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 394, 396 (1999).   
21 See Jacob M. Harper, Technology, Politics, and the New Space Race: The Legality 
and Desirability of Bush’ National Space Policy Under the Public and Customary 
International Laws of Space, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 681, 689 (2008) (noting that “perceptions that 
the US is violating customary international law may themselves have negative foreign policy 
consequences.”)  This is especially true when many states may be uninterested in the 
substantive contours of any given established rule.  See id.  
22 Or a simple majority in both the Senate and House of Representatives in the case 
of a congressional-executive agreement. 
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ratification, the state’s obligations must be made operable, usually through 
both additional administrative and legislative action.  Once successful on each 
of these fronts, there remains substantial uncertainty as to the potential impact 
of unintended consequences domestically and the execution of obligations by 
fellow treaty partners internationally.  These costs preclude agreements even 
where multiple states possess aligned interests and recognize a clear benefit to 
treaty formation.23 
The impediments to new treaty formation apply with at least equal 
force to treaty alteration. Changes to treaties in most legal systems will require 
the exact same processes as those associated with entirely new international 
agreements. 24  Further, collection action problems invoked by treaty alteration 
are severe as states disinvested in the substantive regulation possess little 
incentive to break ranks and states seeking treaty changes are likely already to 
be viewed skeptically as law breakers of the existing regime.25  These 
problems are exacerbated by the fact that the benefits associated with treaty 
alteration are likely to be lower at a rate corresponding to the variance in the 
amount of change sought. 
2. The Power of Custom 
CIL, an equal partner with treaty law, represents those norms rendered 
binding through the existence of state practice followed by a sense of legal 
obligation.26  Such law binds all states, regardless of explicit consent.27  As 
                                                           
23 “Transaction cost economics refines price theory by including consideration of, for 
example, the cost of identifying potential transactors, negotiating agreement and enforcing 
agreement. For a variety of reasons, including the number of interested parties, these 
transaction costs are frequently high in the international context, and opportunities for joint 
gain through contracting may therefore not be realized.”  Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. 
Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 394, 396 (1999).   
24 See Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International law: A Response 
to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143, 164-65 (2001). 
25 Setear, supra note __, at 721-22.  
26 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38; CASSESE, supra 
note __, at 156; A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (1971).   
27 See e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶186 (June 27); Asylum Case (Colom. V. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 274 ¶ 277-8 
(Nov. 20); Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, ¶131 (Dec. 18).   
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such, the recognition of such norms offers a universally binding alternative to 
expensive treaty process.28 
No contemporary legal system is entirely reliant on explicit law 
instruments like legislation or treaties.  The Anglo-American common law 
system defines itself by the power of judicial precedent as a source of binding 
law. While repudiating binding precedent, civil law systems favor custom as 
an independent source of law.  In practice, both civil and common law 
systems have found it wise to borrow from the unwritten source of law of the 
other. 29  Civilian legal systems are finding increasingly unified judicial 
decisions based, in part, on past precedent.30 Common law systems 
incorporate custom as context by which the interpretation of law is 
influenced.31  Both practices serve the indispensable purpose of making law 
more functional by safeguarding reliance of societal practices while providing 
legal rules with the ability to adapt to changing circumstances.32  Expunging 
                                                           
28 As noted by William Aceves, the transaction cost obstacle to treaty formation may 
lead states to prefer customary law to treaties in order to avoid expensive negotiation, 
agreement, and maintenance costs.  Aceves, supra note __, at 1066. “If the transaction costs 
associated with the negotiation of treaty law are high, states may prefer customary 
international law because it allows states to forego expensive and time-consuming 
negotiations. Likewise, if the transaction costs associated with the codification of treaty law 
are high, states may also prefer customary international law because it does not require a 
formal agreement. Finally, if the transaction costs associated with the maintenance of treaty 
law are high, states may prefer customary international law because it functions even in the 
absence of a formal structure.”  Id.   
29 See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: 
Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 73 
(2001) (“The common-law recognition of precedents as a binding source of law is blending 
with the civil-law custom of norm-formation for general prospective deductive application.”). 
30 See e.g., Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law 
(Part One of a Trilogy), 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845,  913 (noting that civil law case law is 
not “the binding rule of stare decisis in Anglo-Saxon law, but in many instances, it is a ‘nearly 
mandatory' rule of stare decisis.”); see also Charles H. Norchi, The Legal Architecture of 
Nation-Building: An Introduction, 60 ME. L. REV. 281, 296 (2008). 
31 See Aniceto Masferrer, Defense of the Common Law Against Postbellum American 
Codification: Reasonable and Fallacious Argumentation, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, (2010) 
(“The Common Law is the mass of the undigested customs, not reduced to system…”). 
32 See Elizabeth B. Wydra, Constitutional Problems with Judicial Takings Doctrine 
and the Supreme Court’s Decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 109, 121 (2011) (common law); Christophe Jamin, Saleilles’ and Lambert’s Old 
Dream Revisited, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 701, 707-710 (2002) (civil law); see generally LEO 
GROSS & RICHARD W. NELSON, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (4th 
ed. 1982). 
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precedent or custom respectively would collapse the basic architecture of both 
systems. The convergence of common law precedent and civilian custom only 
reinforces the crucial nature of each version of implicit law. 33 
CIL plays a similarly crucial role in the international legal system.  
The crippling of CIL has not been accompanied by a correlating rise in a 
different, analogous contender.34  The international legal system, formed with 
the precepts of the civil law system at its core and lacking the judicial 
instruments required of an effective common law jurisprudence, embraced 
custom out of necessity.35  
The “simultaneously stable and provisional” character of custom is 
also of particular value within the distinct attributes of international law.36  
Scholars of international relations have long known that states are influenced 
tremendously by state interest.  The stability and universal binding power of 
CIL encourages coordination around existing norms while avoiding locking 
the law into an eternal doctrinal stance.37  
The current position of CIL belies its stable, but pliable branding. 
Critics rightfully note that our current conceptions of CIL formation, however, 
                                                           
33 David J. Bederman, Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign 
Policy, 50 EMORY L. J. 717, 734-35 (2001).   
34 Notably, despite substantial scholarship criticizing or promoting CIL, the question 
of an alternative, other than additional treaty reliance, never appears to be addressed. 
35 See Colin B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law 
Jurisdiction, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1083, 1105 (“from its earliest stage, international 
law developed among civil law ideas, with the predictable result that it reflected those very 
ideas.”). 
36 Catherine Kemp, Habermas Among the Americans: Some Reflections on the 
Common Law, 76 DENV. U.L. REV. 961, 967 (“the relevant aspects of customary law are its 
simultaneously stable and provisional or tentative character--common law rules can be 'in 
play' long after they are settled--and the fact that there is implied in practices or customs a 
kind of "emergent consensus" about a particular kind of controversy.”). 
37 A common criticism of customary law is that the path to change often (not always) 
requires transgressing the law.  In a way, this is similarly true within the common law.  In 
common law, judges only receive the opportunity to opine on the content of law where the 
unlawfulness of action is in question.  In any event, the critique is only a streng one if the 
aforementioned violations usurp the underlying stability of the legal system more than usual.  
This is far from obvious.  There is little reason to believe that judicial actors distinguishing, 
surreptitiously overruling, or overtly overruling prior precedent are any less disruptive than 
customary change. See Benito Arrunada & Veneta Andonova, Common Law and Civil Law as 
Pro-Market Adaptations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 81, 118-119 (2008) (asserting the 
equivalency of common law and civil law in stability and efficiency). 
NETWORKING CUSTOMARY LAW - SULLIVAN 
 
DRAFT – DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 
 
13 
have failed to produce on the genre’s promise of “flexibility” and 
“suppleness”.38 The opaqueness of state practice and psychological 
dependency of opinio juris has resulted in the sourcing of the raw materials of 
CIL, state practice and opinio juris are fraught with controversy.39  The fact 
that there is little agreement as to how to identify when CIL norms form or the 
substantive boundaries of such norms means that asserting any rule that strays 
from the textbook example is questioned.40  
CIL has been branded as the “weak” side of international law that is 
typically unenforceable and has jeopardized the viability of the international 
legal system as a whole.41  Specifically, commentators assert that CIL is 
unworkably ambiguous, manipulable, undemocratic, divorced from actual 
practice and state consent, and hortatory in character.42 While the precise 
contour of each critique is unique, the unifying theme of CIL skeptics is that 
the lack of empirical knowledge has led to normative creativity.  Because 
ascertaining an objectively provable “truth” to state practice and opinio juris 
has proven elusive, scholars have reacted by an objective body of law in favor 
of their own normative judgments.   
B. Usurping CIL Creates Anachronistic and Unresponsive Law 
                                                           
38  LEO GROSS & RICHARD W. NELSON, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (4th ed. 1982).   
39 Id. at 57. 
40 David J. Bederman, Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign 
Policy, 50 EMORY L. J. 717, 734-35 (2001).   
41 See Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 359, 360 (1988) 
(comparing to treaties); Leslie Deak, Customary International Labor Laws and Their 
Application in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 44 
(noting many feel “customary international law appears to be a vague unenforceable theory 
with no base upon which to stand”); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International 
Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 529 (2000) (stating that “CIL has engendered controversy, 
dimished respect for the [ICJ], and is ultimately unenforceable.”). 
42 See generally Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International 
Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current 
Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 327-30 
(1997); John K. Setear, Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 715, 719 
(2005); Kelly, supra note __ at 450-458; Janis, supra note __ at 362-64.  I will not be directly 
addressing the assertion that CIL, independent of the flaws noted above, does not affect state 
behavior.  See e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International 
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999).  To the extent such critiques are not reflective of the 
legitimacy flaws discussed herein, they will tend to be correct (or incorrect) regarding 
international law as a whole rather than CIL specific. 
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The perceived illegitimacy of CIL incurs tremendous harm.  Legal 
systems require flexibility to operate efficiently.  The continuing divestment 
of CIL’s role as a pliable substrate of international law is causing an 
increasingly anachronistic and unresponsive body of law.43  To date, the 
response to the weakening of CIL has been greater reliance on treaties.44  Due 
to the high costs associated with treaty-making and treaty alteration this treaty 
reliance manifests itself in reading existing treaties more broadly, insisting on 
their unwavering adaptation to changing circumstances and attempting to 
transform their reach from those party to the agreement to the entire globe.45 
Ironically, the further treaties are stretched the more they are susceptible to 
their sparking their own delegitimation.  In the meantime, the more substance 
they are asked to cover, the more they become entrenched, further promoting 
anachronistic rules.46 
Given the criticism of CIL and its increasingly fragile hold on 
legitimacy, one might believe that the destruction of CIL as a binding source 
of law would actually benefit the international legal system.47  In this view, 
the persistence of a weakened body of CIL acts to further obstruct treaty 
formation.  Once definitively removed from the regime design of international 
law, states will not be tempted to rest on weak claims of custom and know 
that, should they desire new law, an explicit agreement establishing such law 
must be made.  Thus, the adaptation to an exclusively explicit agreement 
based legal system will encourage the creation of new law while strengthening 
                                                           
43 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note __ at 333. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 340. 
46 William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International law: Transaction Cost 
Economics and the Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 995, 1061-63 
(1996).  See generally Kaushik Basu et al., The Growth and Decay of Custom: The Role of the 
New Institutional Economics in Economic History, 24 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 1 
passim (1987); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and 
History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 passim (1995). 
47 See Theodore Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 348 passim (1987) (discussing interpretive and law changing defenses of states in the 
law of war). Given the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms, the framing effects of this 
analytic move are substantial.  See id.  Instead of being forced to change behavior or provide 
plausible interpretation of its  
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the force of such law that accompanies the clarity of legal obligation treaties 
provide.48  
In fact, there is little reason to believe that either would occur.  This 
analysis is dependent upon the idea that, absent the ability to rely on CIL, 
states will possess increased interest in new treaty provisions.  Even if true, 
there is little, if any, reason to believe that the costs associated with treaty 
formation would decrease.  More likely, the continuing inability to easily and 
efficiently create new legal instruments or norms would accelerate the current 
trend of excessive dependence on existing treaty regimes.49  As demonstrated 
in correlation with the weakening of CIL, this reliance leads to stagnation of 
legal norms.50  Treaty reliance creates a path dependency in state action and 
promulgates a flow of inapposite or non-operative legal rules.51  Ironically, 
with the passage of time, these inertial forces imbue longstanding treaties with 
a sacred aura of immutability.    
The immutability of treaties would be a minor concern if CIL was 
better positioned to fulfill its traditional role as a legitimate route for filling 
the gaps within and between treaty law.  In such circumstances, legal 
provisions that might be considered anachronistic in isolation are enlivened 
through unwritten augmentation.   
The Constitution of the United States provides an example of staid text 
operating alongside dynamic law.52  The text of the Constitution, while 
                                                           
48 See id. at 359. 
49 Some have asserted that such changes required even longer than decades.  See Paul 
R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 
455, 465 (2010) (“Raditionally a new norm acquired the status of customary international law 
only after two requirements had been satisfied, consistent state practice and opinio juris. 
Customary international law thus changed slowly, often over the course of a century or 
more.”). 
50 Id. at 468. 
51 See Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, October Term 2001 Foreword: Five to 
Four, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 177 (2002); Shickler, supra note __, at 763; Laurence H. Tribe, 
Lost at the Equal Protection Carnival: Nelson Lund’s Carnival of Mirrors, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 619 (2002). 
52 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITTUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT 164-65 (Oxford 
University Press 2006); Robert A. Ferguson, “We Do Ordain And Establish”: The Constittion 
as Literary Text, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 3; Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for 
States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1808-09 
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written broadly and contemplated generally, is unmistakably a product of its 
time.  Despite its reputation as the emblem of freedom and democracy, the 
U.S. Constitution embeds some remarkably contradictory precepts (enshrining 
freedom while institutionalizing slavery) alongside decidedly anti-democratic 
processes of republican government. 53  Despite these inadequacies, its 
overarching validity has endured.  While the energy behind its longevity is 
multi-fold, part of its continuing relevance comes through its continuous 
refinement through the common law practice of judicial precedent. 54  The 
practice of repeated formal legal process interpreting the document’s text that 
provides lasting resolution to contemporary problems means that the “law” 
represented by the document extends far beyond the boundaries set out within 
its text.55   
International law lacks a judicial body with the authority and repeated 
opportunity of the U.S. Supreme Court to refine legal principles.  True to the 
tradition of the civil law system, custom is the source of unwritten law favored 
within the international legal system.56  
The sanctification of the law is a by-product of age, tradition, purpose, 
and path dependency.  As legal instruments age, the substantive rules they 
encompass are no longer questioned.57  Instead, their dictates are incorporated 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
(2009); Michael Les Benedict, Our ‘Sacred’ Constitution – Another View of the Constitution 
as Literary Text, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 27, 31-32 (1987).    
53 See LEVINSON, supra note __, at 32-44; Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court, 
October Term 2000 Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 111-12 (2001). It is also 
worth noting that the evidence also indicates the general public holds a view of constitutional 
interpretation.  See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1813-15 & 1834 n.145.   
54 See LEVINSON, supra note __, at 43. 
55 It should be noted that common law practices and judicial refinement would not be 
sufficient to rescue the U.S. Constitution from some of the anachronisms deeply embedded 
within it.  This reality is precisely why the country has periodically traversed through the 
difficult amendment process, generally with tremendous success. 
56 See Trimble, supra note __ at 255. 
57 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 96-99 (1990).  See John Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, Constitutions as 
Ideology, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 525, 526 (1980); Harold Jonhju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: 
Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 651-53 (1998); Richard 
Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution: An Address Given to the Annual Convention of the 
National Lawyers Guild, July 6, 1968, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 125, 129 (1968-1969); Howard 
Zinn & Laura Stewart, Ideology in the Courtroom, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 711, 714 (1985-
1986).    
NETWORKING CUSTOMARY LAW - SULLIVAN 
 
DRAFT – DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 
 
17 
into the background of societal life, part of the set upon which life unfolds.58  
The longer such rules are incorporated in the society’s practices, they become 
cultural touchstones incorporated into the society’s tradition of law.59  As the 
legal rules of a treaty fade into the background, the norms established by a 
treaty become incorporated in subsequent decisions of both individual nation-
states as well as the international community at large.60  The interconnected 
nature of these rules means that substantive changes to the foundational treaty 
cause a domino effect among other international and national legal rules made 
in reliance of the original instrument – a phenomenon more generally called 
path dependency.61  
Even irrational or obviously anachronistic Constitutional provisions 
can soundly defeat deeply held societal principles.  Prior to the 2000 
presidential election, nearly all American citizens would have told you that a 
crucial component of the “democratic” nature of the nation was fundamentally 
tied to the fact that the state engaged in free and fair elections in which the 
“will of the people” was followed by placing candidate with the greatest 
number of votes in office.62  In that year, however, the recipient of the greatest 
number of votes in the presidential competition, Al Gore, did not win the 
election.63  Instead, George W. Bush was became the American president due 
to an electoral college system designed for the 18th century.64  While Gore’s 
supporters were embittered, few insisted that a Constitutional amendment was 
                                                           
58 Koh, supra note __, at 628-29; Harold Hongj Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 
75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 202 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational Legal Process]. 
59 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of 
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1756 (2003); Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra 
note __, at 201-03. 
60 Harold Jonhju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599, 2657-58 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?].  See Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, supra note __, at 204.  
61 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, supra note __, at 2654-55.  See 
generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 passim (2001); S.J. Liebowitz & 
Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 
passim (1995).   
62 See LEVINSON, supra note __, at 48-49; Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court, 
October Term 2000 Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 111-12 (2001); Laurence 
Tribe, Bush v. Gore and its Disguises, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 290 (2001). 
63 See e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103-04 (2000). 
64 Erick Schickler, Terri Bimes & Robert W. Mickey, Safe at Any Speed: Legislative 
Intent, The Electoral Count Act of 1887, and Bush v. Gore, 16 J.L. & POL. 717, 731 (2000). 
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in order.65  Instead, the public re-oriented its definition of democracy to 
remain consistent with the Constitution’s text.66 
The 2000 election is only one example of how Constitutional 
sanctification has undermined contemporary preferences thus effectuating an 
objectively absurd, or at least normatively undesirable, result.  The 
Constitution’s inaugural delay for newly elected Presidents reflects the 
technical limitations of the 18th century and has no rational justification in 
contemporary America.67  Enabling a new president to be inaugurated 
immediately after his victory is certified, would avoid the self-serving, and 
potentially dangerous, unaccountable lame duck acts of an outgoing leader.68  
The characteristics of legal sanctification apparent in the U.S. 
Constitution have similarly resulted in the consecration of the cornerstone 
substantive treaties of modern international law.  Just as in the Constitutional 
example, the immutability of such instruments creates anachronisms through 
the substantive law such treaties represent.  The anachronism problem of 
sanctification in the treaty context, however is both qualitatively and 
quantitatively more severe than those that arise in the domestic context for 
two reasons.  First, the international community does not possess a legal 
interpretation regime comparable to the U.S. federal judiciary that possesses 
both the opportunity and legitimacy to engage in flexible interpretation of 
treaty obligations to negate the effect of anachronistic tendencies present in 
the law.  Second, the number of treaties, impossibility of amendment, and the 
high transaction costs required to create new treaty instruments means that the 
gross volume of such anachronisms is substantially higher than those 
manifested in domestic systems.  
                                                           
65 RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 189 (2001); Richard L. Hasen, When “Legislature” May 
Mean More than “Legislature”: Initiated Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. 
Gore, 35 HASINTGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 601, 629-30 (2007-2008).   
66 See LEVINSON, supra note __, at 165.   
67 See Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, October Term 2001 Foreword: Five to 
Four, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 177 (2002); Shickler, supra note __, at 763; Laurence H. Tribe, 
Lost at the Equal Protection Carnival: Nelson Lund’s Carnival of Mirrors, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 619 (2002). 
68 David J. Bederman, Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign 
Policy, 50 EMORY L. J. 717, 734-35 (2001).   
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C. Reinvigorating Custom 
The systemic character of anachronism within international law 
requires a systemic response.  A different of conceptualization of how 
customary international law is formed remains the greatest chance for a 
responsive body of law.  The transaction costs of treaty consummation can be 
ameliorated, but cannot be eliminated.  In contrast, the ambiguity, structural 
disarray, and illusory tie to state consent surrounding customary law invites 
reinvention.  The roots of this reinvention lie in a reexamination of the 
justification of transforming practice into law outside the international 
context. 
II. KNOWING CUSTOM THROUGH NETWORKS 
In 2005, a New York doctor, Robert Greenwald, wrote a letter to the 
editor of The New England Journal of Medicine describing an incident where 
physicians and a medical fellow were presented with an infant suffering from 
diarrhea, an unusual rash, immune system failure and a variety of other 
symptoms.69   
The attending physicians and house staff discussed several diagnostic 
possibilities, but no consensus was reached. Finally, the visiting professor 
asked the fellow if she had made a diagnosis, and she reported that she had 
indeed and mentioned a rare syndrome known as IPEX…. It appeared to fit 
the case, and everyone seemed satisfied. (Several weeks later, genetic testing 
on the baby…confirm[ed] the diagnosis.) 
“How did you make that diagnosis?” asked the professor. Came the reply, 
“Well…I entered the salient features into Google, and it popped right up.”70 
The physician reporting the story was dismayed.  “Are we physicians 
no longer needed?  Is an observer who can accurately select the findings to be 
entered in a Google search all we need for a diagnosis to appear, as if by 
magic? […] Even worse, the Google diagnostician might be linked to an 
                                                           
69 Dr. Robert Greenwald, “And a diagnostic test was performed,” 359 N. ENGL. J. 
MED. 2089, 2090 (2005).  
70 Id. 
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evidence-based medicine database, so a computer could e-mail the 
prescription to the e-druggist with no human involvement needed.”71   
The doctor’s reaction is driven by his training and society’s changing 
relationship with its caregivers.  His medical education taught him a 
diagnostic methodology.  That methodology was reinforced over multiple 
years of practice.  Understandably, new intrusions that deviate from or 
(worse) question the validity of his understood methodology are viewed with 
suspicion.72  Externally, society’s view of doctors has also changed 
dramatically.  For much of history doctors were seen as the nearly exclusive 
purveyors of medical information.  Patients, accepting that they lacked access 
to the knowledge held by the doctor, responded by adopting a highly 
deferential posture relative to a doctor’s conclusions.  Over the past twenty 
years, empowered by the availability of medical information on the internet, 
patients have taken an increasingly assertive role.  More than 65% of patients 
research their health condition before a doctor’s visit (assessing whether one 
is necessary) or after the doctor’s visit (assessing the correctness of the 
doctor’s diagnosis).73   
Proponents of our current conception of CIL formation are much like 
the befuddled Dr. Greenwald.  Over the past century, the methodology of CIL 
formation has only tangentially depended upon empirical proof.  While it was 
expected that CIL rules would possess some empirical underpinning, the focus 
had shifted to normative argument.  Recently however, the divergence of 
actual practice and asserted norms has become acutely noticeable, 
compromising the empirical touchstone that undergirds the entire system.   
Attempts to rehabilitate CIL possess value, but ultimately, CIL cannot 
be saved until its advocates are able to offer a way to recreate trust in the 
law’s basic justifications for legitimacy: it’s accuracy, consistency and 
                                                           
71 Id. 
72 According to one study, older doctors are likely to feel threatened and “respond 
defensively” to patients offering information gleaned from the internet while younger doctors 
view the patients’ research as an opportunity for collaboration.  See Miriam McMullan, 
Patients using the Internet to obtain health information: How this affects the patient-health 
professional relationship, 63 PATIENT EDU. & COUNS. 24, 25-28 (2006). 
73 See Suzy A. Iverson, Kristin B. Howard, Brian K. Penney, Impact of Internet Use 
on Health Related Behaviors and the Patient-Physician Relationship: A Survey-Based Study 
and Review, 108 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASSOC. 699-711 (2008).  
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empirical observability.  Fortunately, the forces of information thus far used to 
cripple CIL can be harnessed to revitalize it in this very way. 
A. Legitimacy and Sourcing Law 
The legitimacy and authority of CIL, like all bodies of law, is 
dependent upon coherent regime design.74 Rule creation regimes need to 
fulfill basic fundamental values – accuracy, fairness and efficiency – to 
achieve systemic legitimacy, and in turn, enhance authority.75 Accurate rules 
reflect provable inferences from relevant events. Rules created understandably 
with participatory opportunities and absent undue influence are generally 
considered fair. Finally, efficient rulemaking exists when rules reflecting the 
other basic values can be made with relatively low costs.76  Fair rules  rules  
Some legitimacy derives from possessing observable procedures of 
lawmaking that enable participation of those affected and produce rules with 
substantial clarity with authority exercised accordingly.   
In contrast, modern CIL formation methodology is opaque and 
manipulable.77   The normative emphasis has created “unbridled proliferation 
of contradictory norms” that creates uncertainty and encourages states to 
engage in self-serving and opportunistic rule selection and interpretation.78 
These inconsistencies and manipulations are exacerbated by the fact that, 
                                                           
74 This paper ascribes to the “regime” definition set out by Stephen Krasner as “sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge.”  STEPHEN D. KRASNER, STRUCTURAL CAUSES AND REGIME 
CONSEQUENCES: REGIMES AS INTERVENING VARIABLES (1982). Regime design questions are 
fundamentally empirical in nature. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: 
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 623 (2004) (“regime 
design questions are essentially empirical in nature.”); Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and 
International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 
774-75 (2008); Michael D. Ramsey, The Empirical Dilemma of International Law, 41 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1243, 1252 (2004). 
75 See generally Kaushik Basu et al., The Growth and Decay of Custom: The Role of 
the New Institutional Economics in Economic History, 24 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 1 
passim (1987).    
76 “Costs” here meaning all types of costs (e.g. financial, opportunity, transaction, 
etc). 
77 See Trimble, supra note __. 
78 Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1805. 
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increasingly CIL rules appear entirely divorced from practice in the real 
world.79  
Treaties are legitimized by explicit consent.  As such, treaty law binds 
only those parties shown to have manifested explicit consent through the 
repeated acts that precede (i.e. negotiation, drafting, signing, and ratification) 
and post-date (e.g. invocation, acts of legal implementation) the 
consummation of the treaty in question.  These acts are further solidified by 
the fact that state’s unhappy with their treaty obligations have the opportunity 
to exit the treaty regime they don’t like.  Cumulatively, these expressions of 
consent insulate treaties from state’s that might assert that assertions that a 
treaty provision should not apply due to its normative undesirability or special 
circumstances.80 
Because CIL is universally binding and precludes exit, it cannot 
legitimize itself through consent.81  Customary law is empirical law.82   The 
values associated with empiricism, objectivity and democracy, bestow 
customary law (international and domestic) with its legitimacy.83  The 
doctrine governing the creation of binding customary law turns on the 
fulfillment of a claim about both the existence of a consistent state practice as 
well as what motivates that state practice.84  CIL can only assert its authority 
                                                           
79 See Roberts, supra note __ at 770. 
80 This isn’t to say that states don’t have a variety of available interpretive measures 
to attempt to minimize the scope of treaty law or otherwise blunt its impact.  Despite these, 
arguments that the treaty is simply not binding on the state are rarely made because of the 
expressions of consent (reinforced by exit mechanisms) that characterize that body of law.  
81 See Bradley & ___, supra note __ at 377; Goldsmith & Posner, supra note __ at 
225.  Some argue that a state acquiesence to customary norms is appropriately viewed as 
expressing consent that legitimates the binding nature of CIL rules.  Even if true, that 
legitimating authority is far less probative than the multiple affirmative actions taken by states 
proactively engaged in by states in consummating treaty law.  See Harlan Grant Cohen, 
Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 78 
(2007) ("Treaties, having been negotiated, written, signed, and ratified, present the strongest 
evidence of consent."). 
82 Kelly, supra note __ at 399 (“Customary norms are binding because they are, in 
fact, accepted by all normal members of a society and are observable. Empirical acceptance is 
the touchstone.”). 
83 Id. 
84 BROWNLIE, supra note __, at 6-7; CASSESE, supra note __, at 156-57; HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
368-93 (1958).   
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insofar as the empirics fulfillment of the doctrine in question are observable.  
From their inception, customary law of both the domestic and international 
varieties have rested upon the belief that, once identified, the customary 
practice of states exhibit a pattern of behavior that can be considered “best 
practices” and, once bound in law, can capture efficiencies by encouraging 
justifiable reliance.85  The jurisprudential roots of customary law reflect the 
belief that customs reflect collective wisdom and tend toward normatively 
attractive ends.86  The Romans considered custom as integrating the “general 
habits” of the Roman people as a matter of law and as an equal to other bodies 
of all applicable in the empire.87  To Burkeans, customary law embodies the 
distillation of practices integrating the collective insight and wisdom of 
society’s members.88  Those assertions however, by definition, hold no value 
if the “customary practice” in fact does not represent actual practice.  
Much of the perceived illegitimacy of CIL flows from two hallmarks 
of modern CIL: (1) the law’s reliance on experts in identifying and presenting 
the evidence of practice and opinio juris; and (2) the contemporary tendency 
to approach CIL rules as fundamentally normative rather than epistemic 
questions.    
These two trends separate the basic justification of CIL, the 
desirability of recognizing and coordinating existing practice, and fail to 
provide a broadly applicable justification untainted by unmistakable policy 
preferences and goals. 
1. CIL’s Shift From Empirical to Normative Based Legitimacy 
Theories of CIL formation can be roughly split into “traditional” and 
“modern” methodologies.  The traditional formulation emphasizes the 
delineation of state practice as the cornerstone of CIL, while the modern 
                                                           
85  
86 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-9 (7th ed. 
2008); D’AMATO, supra note __, at 52, 68, 82-84 
87 See BEDERMAN, supra note __ at 19. 
88 John. P. Humphrey, The Revolution oin the International Law of Human Rights, 4 
HUM. RTS. 205, 208 (1974-1975); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary 
International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 158-59 (2007-2008). 
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methodology emphasizes opinio juris.  These two methodologies are united, 
however, in their reliance on experts as the progenitors of CIL norms.89   
The U.S. Supreme Court case decision in The Paquete Habana90 is 
largely considered “a ‘model’ of how CIL becomes established” and a model 
of “traditional” CIL formation methodology.91  It is also emblematic of 
problems posed in relying upon experts in identifying the necessary 
components of CIL.  In The Paquette Habana, the Supreme Court was asked 
to identify whether there was a customary international law rule prohibiting 
the seizure of civilian fishing vessels during time of war.  In answering the 
question in the affirmative, Justice Gray relies on two veins of evidence of 
state practice: specific past examples and and “the works of jurists and 
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made 
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.”92 
With these “[t]ext-writers of authority…it may be affirmed that they are 
generally impartial in their judgment.”93 
Mining the work of such experts, the Court affirms the customary rule 
with a mixture of invoking specific past incidents and historical and 
contemporary scholarly commentary.  At first blush, the temporal breadth of 
the Court’s research is impressive.  The evidence Justice Gray cites in support 
of the rule begins in 1403 with an order from Henry IV of England issuing an 
order to his naval officers informing them of a treaty between England and 
France enabling the citizen vessels flying under both states’ flags to be 
excluded from capture.94  The Court continues, citing several other historical 
examples, including a 1521 treaty between England and France, French and 
Dutch edicts in 1536, an agreement between Franch and Holland in the latter 
                                                           
89 The relative weight among experts is a bit different between methodologies.  
Traditional methodology is more judge driven while modern methodological processes is 
more scholarly and NGO driven. 
90 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
91 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between 
Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 642 (2000). 
92 Paquette Habana at 700. 
93 Id. at 700-701. 
94 Id. at 703. 
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half of the 17th century, French and British orders and an agreement between 
the U.S. and Prussia in the latter half of the 18th century.95 
Paquette Habana is instructive in understanding the limitations of 
traditional methodologies in the sourcing CIL formation through the first 
reciting particular incidents and the invocation of multiple scholars in 
establishing the transformation of the practice into binding law.  
The scope of vision of individuals and groups of experts is inherently 
limited and prone to bias.  It is limited in both direct and indirect ways.  It is 
limited in a direct manner because the individuals engaged in the search are 
limited not only by the information of which they can gain access, but also 
their ability to process that information into usable form.96  It is indirectly 
limited because of its inference of first-hand information from second-hand 
sources.  Justice Gray is using a second-hand source report of French practices 
in vessel seizures and presenting it, much like hearsay, for the truth of the 
matter asserted, i.e. that the French viewed the seizure of fishing vessels as 
unlawful.   
As work in social science has established, individuals tend to seek out 
information that confirms preexisting views.97  Further, when evidence 
contrary to one’s predilections is uncovered it is highly likely to be ignored or 
distinguished.98  Homopholic tendencies mean that selection bias issues are 
even more problematic within groups of individuals than they are in 
individuals.  
The opinion in Paquette Habana invokes both concerns. While the 
breadth of time covered by the Court is significant, extended periods of time 
are not discussed and when contrary practice is manifest, it is discarded as 
proof of the rule “in the breach.”99  The historical examples cited seem 
strikingly convenient for a determination that a prohibition against the seizure 
                                                           
95 Id. at 707-709. 
96 In the “process” context I am referring to the physical limitations of human 
interaction with information.  There are only so many treatises Justice Gray could read (or 
have his clerks read), understand, and set out due to limitations of time and the requirements 
of humanity (again, both his own and his clerks’). 
97 See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note __, at 2654-55.   
98 See Sunstein, Republic 2.0, supra note __ at 114-120. 
99 Id. at 92. 
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of fishing vessels existed in law.  The incidents the Court describes tend to 
occur during time with only limited hostilities between states and often 
represent circumstances in which the seizure of such vessels would have been 
avoided due to limited naval resources or other instrumental concerns aligned 
with the state’s own self-interest.100 Moreover, the Court magnifies isolated 
incidents supportive of the rule it concludes existed and ignores or discounts 
numerous other examples contradicting the existence of the rule.101  Similarly, 
the contribution of the scholars cited in the Court’s opinion was not through 
the provision of additional state practice – most used the same examples as the 
Court – but in their conclusion of the meaning of that practice.102  In other 
words, instead of utilizing scholarly work demonstrating vast state practice or 
overwhelming opinio juris, the Court used evidence that scholars believed that 
a CIL rule existed as proxy evidence that the doctrinal test had, in fact, been 
fulfilled.103    
The deceptively simple doctrine of CIL makes anything approaching 
an objective and comprehensive treatment of state practice and opinio juris 
impossible.   As discussed above, ambiguity is pervasive within the current 
methodologies of identifying established customary rules.  Within the state 
practice factor there is little agreement as to what type of state practice is 
relevant and the relevant weight of varying practices. 104  Nor is there 
agreement on the quantitative threshold of how much, how consistent and by 
how many state acts are necessary to constitute sufficient practice.105  The 
                                                           
100 Goldsmith & Posner, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. at 648-650. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 649. 
103 Notably, while all the scholars cited agreed with historical examples present in the 
opinion, they diverged as to the existence of a CIL norm emanating from such practice.  See 
id. at 650. 
104 See H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 76-77 (1933).  UN General Resolutions are sometimes counted despite their 
nonbinding nature. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary 
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1169 (1999).  The absence of certain practices 
sometimes matter despite the questionable nature of their relevancy.  See id. at 1134. Treaty 
provisions, both bilateral and multilateral, are sometimes counted, often inconsistently as are 
the writings of scholars and jurists despite deep intractable contradictions among them.  See 
id. at 1117.  See also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 Mich. J. 
Int’l L. 115, 125 (2005) (“There is no agreement on the forms of evidence that may be used to 
demonstrate state practice.”).  
105 Guzman, supra note __, at 125. 
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“subjective” nature of opinio juris makes proof of its fulfillment similarly 
difficult.106  Each of these evidentiary difficulties are compounded when one 
seeks to find identifiable boundaries to the underlying norms and principles 
being explored. 
Recognizing the empirical difficulties, contemporary theorists have 
foresworn attempting an objective and comprehensive empirical approach in 
favor of a “modern” approach that emphasizes opinio juris.107  Unlike the 
“traditional” CIL methodologies which, like Justice Gray in Paquette Habana, 
emphasize state practice, the “modern” approach reflects a “deductive 
process” reliant on “statements rather than actions” that proponents assert fits 
more comfortably with the rights oriented nature of contemporary 
international law.108  A natural result of modern CIL formulation is the 
transference of treaty rules into CIL norms.  Because modern CIL formulation 
emphasizes opinio juris, it looks to assess the requisite “sense of legal 
obligation” that accrues through other instruments of law such as treaties.  As 
the number of state parties to any treaty regime grows, one can say that more 
states view themselves bound by the rules set out in the treaty in question.  
One could also deduce that those states are, in practice, following the rule set 
out in the treaty thus fulfilling the state practice prong of CIL formation 
through the assumption that states carry out their legal obligation in practice.   
When proposed CIL norms cannot be grounded directly in treaty law, 
modern CIL looks to the domestic law of the state or statements by leaders 
within the state regarding their position on the norm. Domestic regulations 
regarding employment and labor standards can be used in creating 
                                                           
106 If not more so.  See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
8-9 (7th ed. 2008); D’AMATO, supra note __, at 52, 68, 82-84; BRIAN D. LEPARD, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 20-22 
(2010); H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 47 (1972); 
Olufemi Elias, The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law, 44 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 501, 502-08 (1995).     
107 H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT 380 (1958) (emphasizing state practice); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, 
Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 
AM. J. INT'L. L. 757, 758 (2001) (emphasizing opinio juris).    
108 Other scholars have tweaked the “modern” approach.  Andrew Guzman has 
suggested an approach to opinio juris that emphasizes the “sense of legal obligation” of third-
party states rather than the actor in question, a move that resolves a fundamental circularity 
paradox often levied at CIL formation. Guzman, supra note __, at 123.   
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international labor standards.  Presidential statements chastising a foreign state 
for alleged acts of detainee abuse can be used similarly. 
Put simply, the modern approach resolves the sourcing problem by 
altering what needs to be sourced.  Instead of cataloging actual practice, 
modern CIL catalogs the commitments made by the state through binding and 
non-binding international agreements, domestic law instruments and, as a last 
resort, public statements of high-level officials.109   
The “modern” approach has meaningful advantages110 relative to its 
“traditional” analog and appears to reflect a conception of customary 
international law consistent with how it is perceived by international 
institutions.111  The emphasis on opinio juris is superior to traditional CIL 
formation in creating a framework of more comprehensiveness by cataloging 
existing treaty obligations and public statements.   
The perceived illegitimacy of modern CIL, however, indicates that its 
new focus may invite more problems than it solves.  While it easier to source 
treaties and statements, the cataloging of such evidence is only as strong as it 
is indicative that such sources serve as correct indicia of the “sense of legal 
obligation” that opinio juris requires.  Evidence indicates that discerning the 
“psychological” element of customary international law is no easier than the 
quandaries faced by the state practice orientation of traditional customary 
international law. Worse, institutions like the International Law Commission, 
a UN entity comprised of experts in the field of international law and charged 
with the codification and development of CIL are perceived as engaged in 
adopting legal rules that (consistent with moder CIL) are reside exclusively in 
                                                           
109LEO GROSS & RICHARD W. NELSON, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (4th ed. 1982).   
110 For one, it subverts the problem of discerning state practices (often unclear in 
ideal circumstances and willfully obscured when considered unlawful) in favor of elevating 
the state’s public (presumably more friendly) persona.  Thus, it challenges states to be their 
best selves.  Also, the opinio juris emphasis at least implies a nimbler CIL formation 
structure, one that responds in like speed as the heads of state of various nations respond to 
emerging issues. 
111 This appears especially true in the context of human rights where “the 
identification of CIL consent has become so hard to square with the facts that courts and 
scholars have dropped any pretense that CIL is grounded in actual state practice.” Goldsmith 
& Levinson, supra note __, at 1848.  
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the normative realm.  Specifically, as stated by David Bederman, the “key 
defect of modern custom is that in lauding ideal standards of state conduct, it 
has become detached from actual state practice.”112   
Perhaps most disconcerting is that, in the words of one commentator, 
modern CIL introduces a circularity to the doctrine of CIL formation where 
“opinio juris is necessary for there to be a rule of law, and a rule of law is 
necessary for there to be opinio juris.”113 
2. The Failure of Consent 
The binding nature of international legal rules, both treaty and custom, 
is said to flow from state consent, regardless of the source of the obligation in 
question. 114  The consent doctrine “gives international law its validity” and 
legitimizes the expectation of the international community that legal 
obligations will be followed.115    While explicit consent is expected within 
treaty law, customary international law has long relied upon an assertion of 
implied consent.116  The implied consent notion asserts that states failing to 
object during the formation of customary international law norms have 
consented to those norms as binding rules.117   
The implied consent doctrine is a fiction.  Given the ambiguity and 
uncertainty of norms and practices, especially before they are established as 
law, it is more likely that most states did not even contemplate the norm, 
                                                           
112 DAVID BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 145 (2010).   
113 Guzman, supra note __, at 123.   
114 BEDERMAN, supra note 67 at 140; D’AMATO, supra note __, at 68; L. Oppenheim, 
The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 331-333 
(1908).  
115 BEDERMAN, supra note __, at 140; Ellen Hey, The UN at Sixty: Celebration or 
Wake?, 2 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Rel. 5, 23 & n.140 (2005).   
116 Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of 
International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. OF INT'L STUDIES 133, 
134 (2001) (positive acts of sovereign consent, evidenced explicitly in treaty law and 
implicitly in customary international law" are the foundation for international law); See 
generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS: COMMENTARY ON THE LAW 
OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 19 (James Brown Scott ed. & Gwladys I. Williams trans., The 
Clarendon Press 1950) (1604); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 453 n.28 
(1952); G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the 
Problem of Enforcement MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956).   
117 GUZMAN, supra note __, at 187-88; Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity 
in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 438-40 (1983).    
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much less consent to it.  Further, a state’s implied consent under customary 
international law is functionally irrevocable, an odd result given that the 
explicit consent model of treaties is almost always revocable.118  The resulting 
fictional consent model undercuts the legitimacy, and thus the potential of 
customary law without providing any conceptual or practical benefit. Under 
modern customary law, there is no belief that consent must be proven 
independently of the substantive requirements for customary international law 
formation for a state to be bound.119  It is sufficient for consent to be 
circumstantially proven through the practice and opinio juris of other states.120   
3. The Flaws of Non-Empirically Grounded Custom 
There is consensus that the most pressing criticism of modern CIL is 
its reflection of “ideal, rather than actual, standards of conduct.”121  One 
commentator recently referred to the content of modern CIL as a “matter of 
taste.”122  This perspective flows from the reality that modern CIL formation 
is based on normative sources and justified on normative propositions. 123 
Public declarations by states indicate a normative position of those officials 
                                                           
118 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 65, 67, 68, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331; ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
HOW WE USE IT 34 (1995); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1846-47, 1850. While 
the implied consent cannot be generally withdrawn, oddly, a state’s consent can be vitiated by 
explicit consent to a treaty rule that would otherwise violate a customary rule.  See id.    
119 D’AMATO, supra note __, at 187-99; LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 123-
24, 749-52 (2d ed. 1961); K. WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 160-68 
(1964).    
120 See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567, 575-78, 604-05, 622-23 (2005); 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Den. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶41-3 (Feb. 20); Case 
Concerning the Delimination of the Maritime Line Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. 
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, ¶ 94-96 (Jan. 20); Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. 
Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 27-34 (June 3).  
121 Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International 
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 A.J.I.L. 757, 769 (2001);  
122 Id. at 780. 
123 The normative emphasis of modern CIL is further complicated by the Western 
ideological predispositions that, as a practical matter, carry tremendous influence in norm 
generation.  It has long been recognized that economic and militarily powerful states and 
cultures, residing predominantly in the Western hemisphere, leave modern CIL norms 
susceptible to charges of “normative chauvinism.” Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The 
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 1988-89 AUSTL. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 94. 
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regarding either how they would like to see the content of international 
custom or how they would like to be seen as acting.124   
Perhaps best illustrating the aspirational nature of modern CIL is its 
relationship with state practice.  State practice is not eliminated in modern 
CIL, but it’s relevance “diminishes as the normativity of the obligation 
increases, such that customs on highly normative issues like human rights” are 
considered binding even when actual state practice bears little resemblance to 
the rule articulated.125  As such, state practice is considered an important 
component in assessing traditional areas of international regulations, such as 
the seizure of fishing vessel in time of war considered in Paquette Habana.  
This disparity demonstrates two interrelated points.  First, the sliding scale 
recognizes that empirical grounding in state practice strengthens the validity 
of a CIL norm.  Second, where empirical grounding is difficult to identify, or 
where the empirics might suggest the invalidity of the rule, they are discarded 
in favor of the moral imperative underlying the promulgation of the rule.  
While the theory of modern CIL differentiates itself from the traditional 
conception in hopes of foregoing difficult state practice questions, its 
continuing reliance on isolated experts, coupled with its moralistic bent, 
exacerbates the legitimacy questions posed under the original formulation.   
 B. Finding Custom Through Networked Knowledge 
A year after Dr. Greenwald’s letter to The New England Journal of 
Medicine, doctors Hangwi Tang and Jennifer Ng examined the efficacy of 
Google search in independently identifying diagnoses.126  Drs. Tang and Ng 
took all of the diagnostic cases presented in the NEJM during the 2005 
calendar year and selected three to five search terms from each case to submit 
to the search engine.  They found that Google correctly identified the 
                                                           
124 President Bush’s repeated statements that the United States does not engage in 
torture represent an obvious example.  See Marc Santora, McCain’s Stance on Torture 
Becomes Riveting Issue in Campaign, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 16, 2007 at p. 30. 
125 Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasian in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The 
Dual Role of States, 104 AJIL 179, 206 (2010). 
126 See Hangwi Tang and Jennifer Hwee Kwoon Ng, “Googling for a diagnosis – use 
of Google as a diagnostic aid: internet based study,” 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1143 (2006). 
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diagnosis in 58% of the cases, startling close to the accuracy rate in a similar 
study testing the accuracy of emergency room physicians.127 
Over the past six years, the internet has sharpened its diagnostic skills.  
In 2006, when the Tang and Ng study was performed a search “diagnosis” had 
to be divined assessing the uniformity of one’s search results.  On February 
13, 2012, Google announced it would more explicitly offer its diagnostic 
opinion.  Now “when you search for a symptom or set of symptoms” you are 
provided with a list of health conditions that may be causing those 
symptoms.128  The site creates its suggestions of possible illness by cross 
referencing the search data typically used by individuals researching a 
symptom and the conditions those billions of users tied to those symptoms.  
The medical profession is in little danger of extinction, but in the seven years 
since Dr. Greenwald’s letter, his fear of an autonomous “Google 
diagnostician” has become much closer to reality.   
The Google diagnosis phenomenon is only one example of the 
transformation of data into operational knowledge being utilized by 
corporations, non-governmental organizations, and the state.  Business 
entities, early adopters in the area use “predictive analytics” to determine 
whether you are pregnant and thus amenable to a discount on diapers.129  
Public service organizations like the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s 
“Program on Crisis Mapping and Early Warning” work to predict human 
rights violations by identifying the precursors to such actions such as unusual 
                                                           
127 Id.  See also Richard Krause, Ronald Moscati, Shravanti Halpern, Diane G. 
Schwartz, and June Abbas, “Can Emergency Medicine Resident Reliably Use the Internet to 
Answer Clinical Questions?” 12 WEST. J. EMERG. MED. 442-447 (2011).  Interestingly, other 
studies have indicated that specially designed medical study search engines (such as PubMed) 
are no more effective than general search engines like Google and that, in fact, Google is used 
more frequently by medical professionals.  See Robert H. Thiele, Nathan C. Poiro, David C. 
Scalzo and Edward C. Nemergut, “Speed, accuracy, and confidence in Google, Ovid, 
PubMed, and UpToDate: results of a randomised trial,” 86 POSTGRAD MED. J. 1018 (2010). 
128 See Roni Zeiger, “Improving health searches, because your health matters,” 
INSIDE SEARCH: THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG, February 13, 2012 (available at 
http://insidesearch.blogspot.com /2012/02/improving-health-searches-because-your.html); see 
also “Dr. Google Will See You Now: Search Can Identify Causes of Health Symptoms,” 
MASHABLE BLOG, February 15, 2012 (available at http://mashable.com/2012/02/14/google-
health-search/?utm_source= 
feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Mashable+%28Mashable%29). 
129 Charles Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets,” The New York Times, 
February 16, 2012. 
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governmental activity in certain areas of unstable states through the use of 
imaging and crowdsourcing technologies.130  In government, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Intelligence and the U.S. Department 
of Defense have engaged in dramatic investments to mine “open source 
intelligence”, including social networking sites to “quickly vet, identify, and 
geo-locate breaking events, incidents, and emerging threats.”131   
These examples, spanning multiple industries, methodologies, and 
aims are unified by transforming isolated pieces of information created 
passively and openly produced online into knowledge enabling subsequent 
action by it users, whether they be business, the state, or an individual seeking 
medical treatment.   
The goals of such projects are not new.  Human rights advocates have 
always sought to uncover government action and human rights abuses in order 
to predict or combat them as much as corporations have engaged in 
demographic research to engage in price discrimination.  In the past, however, 
such groups simply lacked the resources to achieve these goals (assuming the 
information was available at all).   
Below, I discuss the crucial features of successfully determining a 
networked knowledge applicable to CIL formation.   The awareness and 
understanding of these features can assist future scholarship in assessing the 
accuracy of specific applied methodologies.  Such methodologies, 
emphasizing networked knowled, should enable CIL to recapture responsivity 
and enable future scholarship to reach the luxury exercised by scholars in 
economics – debating the scope and nature of exceptions rather than very 
existence of the rule.  The principles below do not embrace a specific 
methodology but are intended as a platform by which future scholars consider 
specific methodologies of CIL formation through mining networked 
information.  
 1.  Social Epistemology and Networked Knowledge  
                                                           
130 Steve Lohr, “Online Mapping Shows Potential to Transform Relief Efforts,” THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, March 28, 2011 at p. 3. 
131 Jason Koebler, “FBI Wants to Monitor Social Media for ‘Emerging Threats,’” 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 27, 2012; see also Ellen Nakashima, “Social media 
monitoring concerns civil libertarians,” THE WASHINGTON POST, January 14, 2012 at p. A3. 
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Both the traditional and modern conceptions of CIL are reliant on the 
knowledge ascertained by individual experts (principally scholars and jurists) 
or small, institutional groups of experts (such as the ILC).132   This reliance 
mirrors the historic reality that the epistemic process of acquiring knowledge 
was best accomplished through individual expert works.133  
The dissipating force of the traditional methodology of CIL formation 
was caused by the inability to convincingly capture the truth of the empirical 
proposition set before them. Over time, the proliferation of information on the 
practices of states simultaneously made a “full” examination of state practice 
highly burdensome.  The increased skepticism of the public and fellow experts 
over the course of history, due in part to the greater access to information 
made empirical treatments of state practice increasingly vulnerable to 
criticism of malfeasance when material would, inevitably, be excluded or 
missed.134 
In contrast, under modern CIL formation the normative framework is, 
by design, a relativistic one.  Specifically, the judgments justifying favoring 
opinio juris over actual practice was based on contextual precepts regarding 
rights, sovereignty, culture, and law that are fundamentally post-modern.  
Such judgments are not only likely to vary dramatically between nations, 
economic classes, and political persuasions they are highly informed by the 
institutions and company that formed them.135  As a result the legal judgments 
that birth modern CIL are highly insulated from external forces and influenced 
by the acculturative forces of internal relationships.136 
The relativistic and empirical shortcomings of modern and traditional 
conceptions of CIL formation can be only be overcome by ensuring, through 
showing the justifiability of inferences of observable facts, that assertions of 
CIL formation are known, not simply desired.  One step removed from that 
                                                           
132 See DAVID WEINBERGER, TOO BIG TO KNOW: RETHINKING KNOWLEDGE NOW 
THAT THE FACTS AREN'T THE FACTS, EXPERTS ARE EVERYWHERE, AND THE SMARTEST 
PERSON IN THE ROOM IS THE ROOM (2012). 
133 Id. at 119-125. 
134 BEDERMAN, supra note __, at 145.   
135 Id. at 158. 
136 See Goodman and Jinks, supra note __ at 188 (discussing acculturative forces in 
international law compliance). 
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which is empirically proven, knowledge requires the creation of justifiable 
true belief. 137  Thus, the conversion of information into knowledge requires 
the capability to possess sufficient information to justify one’s belief in the 
underlying proposition.  For purposes of CIL, “knowing” customary law 
requires the information to justify one’s belief that the rule fulfills the 
doctrinal requirements of state practice and opinio juris. 
Social epistemology examines the epistemic properties of discerning 
the ways of knowing societal truths that may not be observable.138  Traditional 
epistemology has long focused on the question of the individual processes of 
the rational mind to reach true, justified, belief.  In contrast, social 
epistemology goes beyond the heuristics of the individual to examine the best 
processes and the advantages of networks.139  While traditional epistemic 
questions examine the individual search for knowledge for those intending to 
have an effect within society, social epistemic work goes in reverse asking 
how a socially networked society can bring knowledge about individual 
facts.140 
Within social epistemology there exists a further refinement in 
converting information to knowledge through networked interaction: network 
epistemology.  General social epistemology remains tied to preconceived 
notions that do not translate easily within cultures.  Network epistemology 
eschews anthropocentric notions in favor of a neutral empirical grounding that 
justifies broader knowledge.  A simple example of this phenomenon is 
illustrated through knowledge ascertained through belief.  When an internet 
search engine is used to search for information online, the result, processed 
through the engine’s algarythmic code can reasonably lead to the conclusion 
that the results represent several of the most relevant websites for each search 
made.141  
                                                           
137 See MARK VAN HOECKE, LAW AS COMMUNICATION 14 (2002); Anthony 
D’Amato, Is International Law Really Law?  79 N.W. U.L. REV. 1293, 1312-1313 (1984). 
138 Id. at 266. 
139 See Adrian Vermeule, Many-minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. OF LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2009). 
140 Id. at 7. 
141 See Paul Humphreys, Network Epistemology, EPISTEME (2009) at 221. 
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Tied to the principles animating and justifying CIL, knowledge 
regarding the fulfillment (or non-fulfillment) of CIL formation doctrine can be 
ascertained if the information produced by networked societies provides 
strongly probative justification that states, in fact, are engaged in state practice 
and possess opinio juris sufficient to trigger the universally binding nature 
inherent to CIL.  Similarly, the empirically grounded and observable nature of 
the inferences providing justification subsequently revitalize CIL by 
reinstating it’s authority to possess its universally binding character.    
Even in a world of identifiable, perfectly objective experts, what 
experts know represents the faintest of shadows relative to the knowledge 
dispersed in society at large.  As a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, at the 
time he wrote the opinion in The Paquette Habana over a century ago Justice 
Gray only had the ability to access a tiny fraction of the information available 
to any internet user today.  The amount of information created, consumed, and 
accessible online today is staggering.  Each day more than 294 billion emails 
are sent, 864,000 hours of video (98.6 years worth)  is uploaded to YouTube, 
and users consume enough information to fill 168,000,000 DVDs.142  The 
amount of user-created content is just as mind boggling. According to Eric 
Schmidt, Executive Chairman of Google, internet users create as much 
information online as was generated in all other forms from the beginning of 
the world to 2003.143   
The quantity is staggering.  But the quantity of information produces is 
simply a byproduct of the technological architecture of networked technology 
that has had revolutionary effects.  The “series of changes in the technologies, 
economic organization, and social practices of production,” writes Professor 
Yochai Benkler affecting “how we make and exchange information, 
knowledge and culture.”144  The networking of content production provides 
                                                           
142 Matt Silverman, A Day in the Life of the Internet, MASHABLE (March 6, 2012) 
http://mashable.com/2012/03/06/one-day-internet-data-traffic/. 
143 Kenny MacIver, Google Chief Eric Schmidt on the Data Explosion, GLOBAL 
INTELLIGENCE FOR THE CIO (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.i-cio.com/blog/august-2010/eric-
schmidt-exabytes-of-data ( “between the birth of the world and 2003 and 2003 there were five 
exabytes of information created.  We now create five exabytes every two days.” quoting Eric 
Schmidt, CEO, Google). 
144 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006). 
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tremendous pieces of information with various curatorial processes integrated 
within the very context through which content is produced. 
The recent rise of the “wealth of networks” has created a multitude of 
methods for producing knowledge.  Examples abound.  In 2009, search 
aggregation (the practice of aggregating and comparing the use of search 
words across the world) saved lives by tracking the spread of the H1N1 flu 
pandemic faster and more accurately than the Center for Disease Control.145 
Encyclopedia publishers have long stressed the accuracy of their material, but 
mass independent collaboration devices like Wikipedia have been empirically 
shown to possess equivalent accuracy while possessing more than 50 times 
more material.146  Prediction markets are markets in which prices are set 
relative to betting activity regarding the occurrence of an even in the future.  
In 2008, such market outperformed all major polls and mechanisms averaging 
such polls, missing Barack Obama’s margin in the Electoral College by a 
single point.147   
While the volume of information available is a necessary precursor to 
networked knowledge, the conversion from information to knowledge would 
remain impossible without a way to identify the indicia of the fact sought, and 
the ability to aggregate that indicia from the information dispersed throughout 
the network.148 Collectively, the endeavor of using technology to cull 
knowledge from networked information is properly classified as network 
epistemology.149 
2.  Knowledge, Numbers, and Diversity 
                                                           
145 Jeremy Ginsberg, Matthew H. Mohebbi, et. al., Detecting influenza epidemics 
using search engine query data, NATURE (2009) at 457.  See also, Andrea Freyer Dugas, Yu-
Hsiang Hsieh, et al., Google Flue Trends: Correlation with Emergency Department Influenza 
Rates and Crowding Metrics, 10 CLIN. INFECT. DIS. 1093 (2012) (confirming accuracy and 
speed). 
146 Jim Giles, Internet encyclopaedias go head to head, NATURE, 438, 900–901 
(2005) (comparing Wikipedia to Encyclopedia Brittanica). 
147 Alvin I. Goldman, Systems Oriented Social Epistemology, OXFORD STUDIES IN 
EPISTEMOLOGY (2009). 
148 The specific examples outlined above should not be read to the exclusion of other 
similarly positioned mechanisms such as crowdsourcing and open source production. 
149 See Weinberger, supra note __ at 245-49. 
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The unifying feature of collective intelligence theory is that groups of 
decision-makers make better, more accurate judgments than do individuals, 
even when the individuals in question are experts.150 Aggregated digital data 
is not only likely to provide new information for customary international law 
formation, but more accurate information.  The origin of customary law, in 
both the domestic and international sphere, owes much to the notion that 
practices are likely to reflect the reasoned judgments of community 
members.151   
Modern economics serves as an instructive example.  A basic 
economic premise of economics is that the information relevant to individual 
economic decisions exists only in dispersed, incomplete, and often contrary 
fragments scattered across, and residing within, a society.152 Even the most 
dedicated central planners could not gather all of the information that make up 
the market pricing system.153  When government misjudges a fixed price too 
low (a ceiling price), the goods affected disappear from public vendors, are 
sold selectively to preferred customers, and a black market appears where the 
desired goods are sold at above ceiling (and sometimes above market) prices.  
When the government’s price is too high (a floor price) there is excess supply, 
retailers are uninterested in purchasing from suppliers, the government is 
often forced to purchase the excess supply, and producers sell for a loss in 
parallel markets. 
Market pricing represents Creating an independent mechanism 
consolidating this fragmented information in order to create an optimal 
distribution of goods that reflects the collective intelligence of the market.154  
In short, the sampling of large numbers of participants creates an empirically 
observable and normatively desirable result.  It is empirically observable as 
you track the aggregation of the numbers.  It is normatively desirable because 
                                                           
150 See Adrian Vermeule, Many-minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. OF LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2009). 
151 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 
YALE L.J. 71, 75-76 (2000). 
152 Thomas Piketty, The information-aggregation approach to political institutions, 
43 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 791, 792 (1999). 
153 The prevalence of illegal markets and surplus products evidence such failures. 
154 Id. at 794. 
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the final result “tracks the truth” better than any materially smaller group 
attempting the same task. 155 
Democratic theory reflects a similar wisdom.156  Democracy is not 
only desirable due to the provision of procedural fairness, but based on 
substantial evidence that democracy “tracks the truth”, leading to not only a 
fair outcome, but a correct one.157 The epistemic value of democracy is 
embodied in the Condorcet Jury Theorem.  The “Law of Large Numbers” 
posits the simple rule that as the size of sample group grows expectations and 
actual occurrences tend to converge.158   
The Condorcet Jury Theorem is the sociological extension of the Law 
of Large Numbers relative to group knowledge.159 The Jury Theorem asserts 
that when members of a group choose between two alternatives, as the size of 
the group increases, “the probability that a majority vote of the group is 
correct tends towards certainty” so long as systemic bias doesn’t compromise 
the result.160  In other words, larger groups perform better than smaller groups, 
while smaller groups perform better than individuals. 
The superior accuracy of group judgments over individuals asserted by 
the Jury Theorem is based upon the individual strands of knowledge held by 
individuals coming into sharper focus due to the cancellation of individual 
biases in-group decisions.  Individuals never have perfect information when 
making judgments or even speak on facts. The experience gathered by 
individuals over time is further nuanced by context.  
                                                           
155 John. P. Humphrey, The Revolution oin the International Law of Human Rights, 4 
HUM. RTS. 205, 208 (1974-1975); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary 
International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 158-59 (2007-2008).  
156 John. P. Humphrey, The Revolution oin the International Law of Human Rights, 4 
HUM. RTS. 205, 208 (1974-1975); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary 
International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 158-59 (2007-2008). 
157 See David Estlund, “Making Truth Safe for Democracy,” in THE IDEA OF 
DEMOCRACY (eds. David Copp, Jean Hampton and John Roemer) (1993) at 71-79. 
158 ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY 97 (2008); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1803; Fernando Teson, 
Defending International Law, 11 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 87, 89-91 (2005).  
159 Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet, A survey of the principles 
underlying the Draft Constitution (1792) translated and excerpted in: McLean and Hewitt at 
190-220 (1994). 
160 Id. at 233. 
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The corresponding nature of the size of the group and valid judgment 
flows from the fact that larger groups are more likely to represent a more 
heterogeneous sample.  As the heterogeneity of the group increases, the more 
likely it is that they will be negatively correlated, thus reducing the error value 
of the group’s final determination.   
In other words, the size of the group is, in a way, a proxy for the 
existence of epistemic diversity.  The accuracy of the group is directly related 
to the correlation of biases throughout the group.  In small groups, strong 
biases of individuals can strongly skew the accuracy of the group’s collective 
judgment.  As the group grows, strong biases in any direction are offset by 
equally strong biases in opposite directions.  Together, the noise of false bias 
is cancelled out.  
Absent the normative methodology of modern CIL, the original 
conception of customary law is not only amenable, but classically designed to 
incorporate the democratic gains of large, diverse numbers.  The 
“antidemocratic” character of CIL is a concern repeatedly expressed by 
skeptics of customary law.161 Modern CIL’s reliance on unelected scholars, 
the focus on official statements, and the demise of the persistent objector 
doctrine reinforce this critique.162   
However, the antidemocratic elements of modern CIL are not endemic 
to custom, but are tethered to its normative formulation and sourcing.163  The 
development of customary law is quite populist in nature.  In European civil 
                                                           
161 See Edward T. Swaim, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 627, 700 (2001) (noting that “[c]ustom’s critics increasingly stress its antidemocratic 
elements.”); Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971, 
2017 (2004);.  To the extent CIL is antidemocratic by usurping the domestic political 
preferences of specific states there is no reason to believe that it does so in greater degree than 
treaty formation.  See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an 
Outdated Concept, 97 A.J.I.L. 782, 783 (2003) (discussing “sovereign” treaty making). 
162 Stephan, supra note __, at 245-48; Trimble, supra note __, at 717-23. 
163 It is true that, at the domestic level, a networked CIL could be antidemocratic in 
the strict sense.  Where domestic populations are popularly opposed to a networked CIL norm 
they could remain bound against their democratic wishes.  This, of course, would only be 
antidemocratic assuming that there did not exist either an overarching democratic 
commitment to international law.  Even in this circumstance, the flexibility provided by the 
general maneuverability within IL generally (and particularly CIL) indicates that the depth of 
this problem would not be substantial. 
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law systems, the model for CIL, customary law was an unmistakably 
democratic form of law making in a world otherwise dominated by the 
monarch.164  For these systems, custom was “unofficial” law, in which the 
practices of people were transformed and ultimately enforced by the governor, 
even though he had no role in creating it.165 
3.  Adaptable Aggregation. 
The accessibility of information itself does not necessarily create the 
reasonable belief of truth necessary to create knowledge. An information pool 
used to distill reliable networked knowledge must be able to isolate and 
aggregate the expressions relevant to the knowledge sought and be 
continuously refreshed. A vast internet of websites is worth little absent an 
ability to efficiently search that information to cull the material you are 
seeking.166  Similarly, once organized, the value of information online would 
grow stale quickly without the ability to quickly incorporate and utilize newly 
created information.  The ability to gather relevant information on a 
continuously renewed basis represents adaptable aggregation.  
The civil law origin of customary law represents a foundation in 
“evolutionary aggregation.”167  At the time of the inception of custom as a 
source of law, converting longstanding practice into law was justified because 
such practices have “stood the test of time” and thus, are properly considered 
a reflection of the collective wisdom of multiple generations.168 Customary 
                                                           
164 Id. at 312. 
165 See MARK VAN HOECKE, LAW AS COMMUNICATION 14 (2002); Anthony 
D’Amato, Is International Law Really Law?  79 N.W. U.L. REV. 1293, 1312-1313 (1984). 
166 Even with all of the information present on the internet the Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative project crowdsourcing satellite imagery would be useless if it was unable to gain 
access to such imagery or if it had no understanding by which to analyze the images it 
possesses. 
167 See Kyung-Joong Kim and Sung Bae Cho, Evolutionary aggregation and 
refinement of Bayesian networks, IEEE CONGRESS ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 2006, 
pp. 1513-1520, 2006.  While I prefer the “evolutionary aggregation” terminology, the concept 
it encompasses is designed to include a host of similar arguments, most prominently, the 
Burkean perspective regarding the value of tradition. 
168 See Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism before the 
Constitution, 1998 U. Ill. L. rev. 173, 188 (1998); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Tension Between 
legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law, 33 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 131, 135 (2005); 
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the 
Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-12 (1992) (regarding custom and efficiency). 
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practices provide guidance for the agnostic or clueless.  For example, if you 
become lost in a forest, discovering a trail of any significance provides create 
solace because the path represents that many have gone before you down that 
path.  The simple fact of the past presence of such travelers is, in and of itself, 
meaningless.  The relief is the product of the highly reasonable belief that 
those travelers were making their journey for the purpose of getting to a 
destination.  Through another reasonable inference, one can conclude that the 
destination will have people present now that can assist you in a time of need. 
At its inception, customary law’s dependence on unwritten rules 
engendered legal change through an organic, decentralized communication of 
content that favors overarching rules.  As circumstances change customs shift 
in corresponding measure. 169 As circumstances change, making an original 
practice impossible or excessively impractical, community members 
communicate as to the best available alternative typically hewing closely to 
the preceding customary norm. 170  Custom’s reliance on communication, and 
the fact that uncomplicated material is communicated (and understood) more 
readily provides facilitate its adaptability and enable experimentation at levels 
where greater detail may be required.  
The recognition of customary law was a highly significant 
advancement in law and cutting-edge in its day.171  The value of “tradition” as 
a proxy of judgment, however, provides only a very rough notion of societal 
knowledge and is prone to inertia.172  Once established, a variety of 
conformity driving mechanisms, such as path dependency, erode custom’s 
reflection of judgment.  
                                                           
169 ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY 97 (2008); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1803; Fernando Teson, 
Defending International Law, 11 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 87, 89-91 (2005).  
170 Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control 
Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549, 1593 (1991). 
171 Id. at 1588. 
172 See e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and 
Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 61-62 (1990).  While articulating a 
more affirmative role of individuals, Lung-chu Chen likewise asserts that citizens are already 
accounted for “under the concept of ‘cutom’ that creates law through widely congruent 
patterns of peoples’ behavior and other communications…”.   LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 
80 (1989).  For a general discussion of various challenges to the state-centric model of 
consent and CIL formation in the literature, see Ochoa, supra note 109, at 142-148.   
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III. IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 
The final aspect examined relates to the impact of a “networked 
knowledge” approach to CIL formation within the larger international system.  
To be sure, the final impact can only be discerned relative to innumerable 
other legal regime questions.  However, there are three distinct and direct 
consequences. 
A.  International Personality 
Under traditional notions of international law, only states were 
governed by international law and the regulatory subject matter of the field 
was correspondingly limited.173  Only quintessential transnational activity (i.e. 
armed conflict, trade) and sovereignless areas (the high seas) were regulated.   
Since World War II, the jurisdictional scope of international law has 
expanded dramatically.  International human rights moved international law 
past the sovereign boundary by governing purely domestic action. 174   The 
imposition of international criminal liability decisively declared individuals 
subject to international legal punishment, but without a role in the formation 
of such rules.175   
                                                           
173 John. P. Humphrey, The Revolution oin the International Law of Human Rights, 4 
HUM. RTS. 205, 208 (1974-1975); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary 
International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 158-59 (2007-2008).  
174 Professor Paust invokes General Assembly resolutions as an ideal source of 
evidence regarding public opinion.  Paust, supra note __, at 75-77.  Ochoa argues that 
discerning the content of individual expectations should be more holistically attained citing 
NGOs, General Assembly resolutions, domestic legal instruments and public polling efforts.  
Ochoa, supra note __, at 176-186.   
175 Ochoa, supra note __, at 153, 158. “If this assumption [that states were exclusive 
subjects under international law] ever was a realistic description of international law, it no 
longer is.” Id. at 152. The post-War Geneva Conventions established a substantially higher 
standard of individual protections.  See e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, August 6, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609;  Similarly, the Nuremberg trials provided the philosophy and nascent 
framework of international criminal law.  Lisa J. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of 
Criminal Justice in Transitional Justice Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 918 (2009).   
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The undesirable asymmetry of imposing liability on individuals 
without providing a corresponding role in the law formation process has 
sparked a search for “bottom-up lawmaking” through the inclusion of 
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs,176 or new categories of law 
formation that are more individually oriented.177  In the best of scenarios, the 
use of such proxies seems unlikely to accomplish more than substituting the 
judgments of one imperfect proxy with that of another.178  In the worst 
scenarios, the public and politically accountable proxy of the state is dislodged 
by unaccountable actors with specialized policy investments.  Professor 
Christiana Ochoa sharpened these normative intuitions into a direct call for 
formal incorporation of individuals in the doctrine of customary international 
law formation through methods such as surveys.179 
A move toward a collection of individual expression through 
networked technology provides a reliable theoretical framework for direct and 
uninvasive opportunity for the expressions of individuals to not only reflect 
custom, but to actively participate in its creation and alteration.  The volume 
of expressions that create networked knowledge are both difficult to 
manipulate and far more resistant to special interest capture. 180 
B.  A Useful Platform for Principled Hierarchies of Norms 
                                                           
176 See Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The 
Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 213 (1991). 
177 See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The 
Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2005). 
178 See LEPARD, supra note __, at 33 & 209 n.6; Kal Raustiala, The ‘Participatory 
Revolution’ in International Environmental Law, 21 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 537, 564, 573 
(1997).      
179 See Ochoa, supra note __, at 142-48. 
180 See Cass R. Sunstein, Idealogical Amplification, 14 CONSTELLATIONS 273, 274 
(2007) (discussing ideological amplification and suppression among like-minded groups).   
The inclusion of NGOs and General Assembly resolutions exemplifies a normative 
predisposition of the idealism critique that has dogged modern customary law.  The peculiar 
dynamics of the UN General Assembly appear more representative of the insularity of 
international organizations than the world populace.  Similarly, even an intensive effort to 
include a broad variety of NGOs with a variety of perspectives would not resolve the force of 
self-selection that nurtures the growth and make-up of such organizations.  Nor does it seem 
plausible that international scholars and officials that hold such sway in identifying or 
codifying customary international law would welcome organizations representing positions 
broadly unpopular among their ranks (e.g. socially conservative, anarchic, religious, 
libertarian). 
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As noted by Professors Jack Goldsmith and Darryl Levinson, modern 
international law lacks “centralized, hierarchical ordering” that results in 
“struggles to coordinate public understandings of the content and application 
of its norms.”181  In large part, the coordination problem Goldsmith and 
Levinson cite, is a by-product of the unobservable and normative nature of 
modern CIL.  Unable to provide a convincing gauge (in quantity or quality) of 
relevant CIL formation elements, modern CIL rules are usually placed on the 
same uncertain footing. 182 
Modern CIL is binary.  Generally, under current doctrine, once a norm 
has “hardened” into customary law it possesses the same force and 
establishment of all other such rules.183    Networked CIL formation would 
provide granular detail.  Networked knowledge will provide fine grained 
detail of differentiations between the volume of state practice across multiple 
norms.  Just as soft law has provided an opportunity to create international 
rules exerting exclusively political force, the provision of substantial data 
undergirding networked CIL may provide soft CIL – perhaps not universally 
binding, but reflecting the influence of identified best practices across 
multiple states.  In short, the depth offered by networked CIL formation can 
serve as a method by which international law can reclaim a framework of the 
“hierarchical ordering” necessary to effective governance. 
D. The Normative Value of Accuracy 
                                                           
181 Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1808.   
182 See P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 15-26 (1952); H. LAUTERPACHT, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3-72 (1950); C. NORGAARD, THE POSITION OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966); Ian Brownlie, The Place of the Individual in 
International Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 435 (1964); Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About 
the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11, 16 (1978); Jeffrey H. Louden, 
Domestic Application of International Human Rights Law: Evolving the Species, 5 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 161 (1981-1982); Sean MacBride, Conference of European Jurists on 
“The Individual and the State,” 3 INT’L LAW 603 (1969); Till Muller, Customary 
Transnational Law: Attacking the Last Resort of State Sovereignty, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 19, 33 (2008); Edwin W. Tucker, Has the Individual Become the Subject of 
International Law?, 34 U. CIN. L. REV. 341 (1965).   
183 Jus cogens norms are an exception.  However, the “depth” argument that follows 
applies with equal strength to the definitional difficulty surrounding the scope of those norms.  
See generally, Thedor Meron, A Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 A.J.I.L. 1 
(1986). 
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Theoretical changes and proposals to customary international law 
formation have mostly been permeated with a scholarly assessment of 
normative value judgments as to the “best” content of international law norms 
and asserting pragmatic gains as an ancillary benefit.  This work has played a 
major role in the expansion of international law. 
It is a necessary concession to note that, under a networked CIL 
approach, the substantive scope of CIL would change in ways that many 
international law scholars might find disturbing.184  The law that remains, 
however, should possess greater legitimacy, enforceability, and clarity.  
Further, major elements of legal regime design do not operate in isolation.  
Legitimacy enhancements within one realm tend to emanate crossover 
benefits.  Within the international legal system, treaty instruments are most 
likely to be the ultimate beneficiaries.  CIL with greater clarity and authority 
will ease the burden of treaty instruments, offsetting some of the costs 
associated with treaty alteration.  Relatedly, CIL filling the gaps between 
treaties should similarly enhance the legitimacy of treaties by discouraging the 
stretching of treaty provisions beyond their anticipated application. 
CONCLUSION 
Networking customary law answers the most substantial challenges 
facing modern CIL formation, reinstating CIL as a responsive body of law 
capable to answer the challenges of our contemporary, globalized society.  In 
addition to avoiding the harms inherent to modern CIL’s normative emphasis, 
reinstating an empirically oriented and high-resolution vehicle for law 
formation will provide an observable, quantifiable foundation of accuracy that 
not only has the chance to enhance the authority of CIL but also to 
reinvigorate the system’s entire infrastructure.   
 
 
                                                           
184 In relation to some shifts, I am likely to be included among such scholars. 
